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Abstract. With the prevalence of complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) increasing in western
societies, questions of the ethical justiﬁcation of these alternative health care approaches and practices
have to be addressed. In order to evaluate philosophical reasoning on this subject, it is of paramount
importance to identify and analyse possible arguments for the ethical justiﬁcation of CAM considering
contemporary biomedical ethics as well as more fundamental philosophical aspects. Moreover, it is vital to
provide adequate analytical instruments for this task, such as separating ‘CAM as belief system’ and
‘CAM as practice’.Findings show that beneﬁcence and non-maleﬁcence are central issues for an ethical
justiﬁcation of CAM as practice, while freedom of thought and religion are central to CAM as belief
system. Many justiﬁcation strategies have limitations and qualiﬁcations that have to be taken into account.
Singularly descriptive premises in an argument often prove to be more problematic than universal ethical
principles. Thus, non-ethical issues related to a general philosophical underpinning – e.g. epistemology,
semantics, and ontology – are highly relevant for determining a justiﬁcation strategy, especially when
strong metaphysical assumptions are involved. Even if some values are shared with traditional
biomedicine, axiological diﬀerences have to be considered as well. Further research should be done
about speciﬁc CAM positions. These could be combined with applied qualitative social research methods.
Key words: alternative health care, applied ethics, CAM, complementary and alternative medicine, ethical
justiﬁcation of complementary and alternative medicine, medical ethics
Introduction
In the recent decades, the use of complementary
and alternative medicine (CAM) has become an
everyday issue in health care. Several studies in
modern western societies claim that up to 50
percent of the population commonly use CAM-
related therapies (for example Barnes et al., 2004
for the U.S.A.; Ernst, 2000 for the U.K.; Thorne
et al., 2002). A literature review conducted by
Astin et al. (1998) stated that in industrialized
nations large numbers of physicians refer to CAM
therapies and believe in their usefulness and
eﬃciency. In Switzerland, the representative study
of Leuenberger and Longchamps (2001) about
hopes and expectations of medicine, on behalf of
the Swiss Academy of Medical Sciences (SAMS),
showed that roughly 60% of the population
wish, modern medicine would give CAM more
consideration. Although many of these studies
have to be treated with care due to diﬀerent
methodologies, cultural background and years
studied, this development is clearly distinguishable.
As the interest in CAM increases it is argued
whether CAM can be justiﬁed on an individual and
social level. Common discussions often focus on
political, ‘ideological’ or scientiﬁc2 (methodologi-
cal) levels, whereas there is only little academic
work dedicated to questions of ethical justiﬁcation
of use, oﬀer and promotion of CAM. Even
scholarly works from respected medical ethicists,
e.g. Daniel Callahan (2002), on the topic seldom
address those questions systematically and suﬃ-
ciently. Furthermore, some articles (for example
Thorne et al., 2002; Ernst and Stone, 2004) have
the tendency to focus on issues of research methods
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rather than ethics per se. More fundamental
questions are seldom examined:
How can CAM be ethically justiﬁed in general?
Which principles may collide with the use of CAM
(epistemological reﬂections on the philosophy of
science taken into account)? Where might be the
limits of justiﬁcation? What philosophical under-
pinnings have to be reﬂected upon?
This paper will try to give an exploratory report
focussed on fundamental justiﬁcation issues.
Aim and method
The paper uses a philosophical analysis of possible
and plausible ethical justiﬁcations for the general
use of CAM. The epistemic aim of the paper will
not be to give ﬁnal answers to all posed questions.
Rather, the paper tries to provide a systematic
analysis of principles, concepts and values that can
be considered relevant to this debate. In addition it
will help to reveal and to systematize assumptions
and principles involved.
Philosophical disclaimer
The paper is written from a western perspective
and according to the tradition of ‘analytic’ philos-
ophy.
Preliminaries
Complementary and alternative medicine (CAM)
To provide a ﬁnal deﬁnition for ‘CAM’ is difﬁcult,
and perhaps impossible. Some authors deny the
existence of a universal deﬁnition because CAM is
mainly historically and culturally constituted (a
‘social construct’) like ‘traditional medicine’. It has
to be stressed that the term is sensitive to the
situation in different contexts. Therefore, only
genetic deﬁnitions that pay attention to the context
of origin can be given (e.g. Drane, 1995; Dalen,
1998). One context-sensitive deﬁnition is the
Eisenberg-deﬁnition based on the criteria of med-
ical interventions that are not taught widely at
medical schools (Eisenberg et al., 1993). Other
approaches eliminate the use of the term ‘CAM’
altogether, and propose using an ‘evidence based
medicine’ approach: if a treatment is adequately
tested, it becomes mainstream (accepted) medicine
(Angell and Kassirer, 1998; Fontanarosa and
Lundberg, 1998). Furthermore it seems that there
exist mostly negative deﬁnitions (e.g. Ernst and
Stone, 2004). On the base of biomedicine (appli-
cation of the principles of natural science to clinical
medicine) CAM is deﬁned ex negative. Therefore
an extensional deﬁnition is given rather than an
intensional one. Even the National Centre for
Complementary and Alternative Medicine
(NCCAM) in the United States provides a negative
deﬁnition: ‘‘[CAM] is a group of diverse medical
and health care systems, practices, and products
that are not presently considered to be part of
conventional medicine’’ (NCCAM, 2006). Addi-
tionally, such an approach is problematic since it
depends extensively on the meaning of ‘conven-
tional medicine’, a term that has no clear deﬁnition
either.
Deﬁnitions based on ‘social construction’ may
be pragmatically useful (as they for example give
account to different laws in different countries),
but are philosophically unsatisfactory: ﬁrstly
because of the well-known problem of what
should be understood under ‘social construct’
(Hacking, 1999); secondly because characteristics
of a deﬁnition relying solely on ‘social construct’
could eventually be too dependant on social/
political contexts (e.g. just descriptions of the
beliefs of diﬀerent social groups). In this way
relevant aspects (social and non-social, e.g. cog-
nitive ones) of the phenomenon ‘CAM’ might be
ignored.
Fuller establishes three reasons why a therapy is
labeled as unorthodox or ‘alternative’ (Fuller,
1995): (1) alternative worldview (relative to ‘wes-
tern mainstream’ or ‘mainstream western medi-
cine’), mainly derived from a spiritual belief system
(e.g. New Age medical systems); (2) not validated
by orthodox medical standards (e.g. many cancer
treatments); and (3) a therapy is a service outside of
medical mainstream that is ignored or deemed of
secondary importance (e.g. midwifery). The sug-
gested deﬁnition for this paper will focus on CAM
in the sense of Fuller (1). This unfortunately will
lead to some ‘simplicism’. It must be granted that
some issues which will be analysed, proposed and
assumed in this paper do not have the same bearing
for all therapies, remedies and belief systems which
are or might be referred to as CAM. This especially
applies to those referred to in Fuller’s meanings (2)
and (3). In addition to common understandings of
the concept ‘CAM’ as seen in this section, it might
prove fruitful to diﬀerentiate analytically between
‘CAM as practice’ and ‘CAM as belief system’.
Since the paper focuses especially on CAM relying
on an ‘alternative world view’, the following
characteristics are deemed important for this
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purpose, and have to be understood as being part
of a stipulative, explicative deﬁnition:
A thing x is called CAM (1) if
(necessary, but not sufﬁcient requirement): It is
claimed that x is able to heal illness (or at least
certain kinds of illnesses) and/or to explain illness,
and x is not considered ‘mainstream/orthodox
medicine’, and x has at least one of the following
characteristics (x’s that fulﬁl more or less these
characteristics are stronger or weaker versions of
CAM (1)):
– content-oriented metaphysics: x has a content-orien-
tated metaphysical fundament concerning disease/
health e.g. asserts principles, state of aﬀairs, causal
relations which are considered ‘metaphysical’,3
and/or is strongly dependent on the truth of the
metaphysical beliefs. Believers and practitioners of
x have explicit ‘metaphysical commitments’.4
– metaphysical explanations: x gives metaphysical
(instead of physical, biological or psychological)
explanations of the causes of physical illness (Ful-
ler, 1995).
– ‘holism’: if x is entitled to have beneﬁts that can
be classiﬁed to be mental, psychological, social
and spiritual, then x claims to be ‘holistic’ in its
healing eﬀect (Ernst and Stone, 2004).
– ‘spiritual world view’: if x gives metaphysical
explanations for disease/health and if x is
considerably a ‘spiritual world view’ (Ruhl,
2002), then the metaphysical beliefs of CAM
are related to supernaturalism and/or some kind
of mind-body-dualism (if idealism is not
embraced);
– vitalism: if x is a ‘spiritual world view’ and x pro-
poses that there is a distinct ‘life force’ that is rel-
evant to disease/health, then vitalism is part of
the metaphysical belief system of x;
– ‘magical thinking’: If x is vitalistic and x is enti-
tled to heal through this ‘life force’, or to use it,
then x relies on ‘magical thinking’, proposing
magic healing powers or an ‘‘unlimited therapeu-
tic power of the mind’’ (Kaptchuk and Miller,
2005).
I would further suggest that with regard to
‘metaphysical commitment’ and the great variety
of CAM one should think rather in a continuum
than in a simple dichotomy. In this continuum,
the instances of CAM that have less ‘metaphysical
commitment’ and may seek scientiﬁc acceptance
are located on the left side. On the right side
are instances of CAM which have a strong
‘metaphysical commitment’. Here CAM will not
only be a medicine, but also a spiritual world-view
e.g. religious faith healing.
Values
An important thing concerning values is that there
could also be axiological differences in the analysed
positions: biomedicine and CAM could rely on
other axiologies that imply a different hierarchy of
values. Perhaps biomedicine, as a scientiﬁc enter-
prise, values truth and knowledge higher as the
subjective (psychologically) well-being of a person,
while certain CAM positions might value this
much higher than truth and knowledge. Axiolog-
ical differences are hard to come by, as it is difﬁcult
to justify a hierarchy of value. It is especially
difﬁcult to prove the value of truth above all other
values, as it is often traditionally upheld in
philosophy of science and perhaps in science itself
(Kitcher, 2001).
Finally, positions may differ in the ‘value of a
value’: is a given value an intrinsic or extrinsic
value? For example, it might be that CAM
positions regard truth more as an extrinsic value
than an intrinsic one, whereas biomedical sciences
tend to regard truth as an intrinsic value.
Analytical levels of ethics in CAM/focus of the paper
It is important to make a distinction between three
speciﬁc analytical levels where one can pose ques-
tions in relation to ethics in CAM5:
Level 1: (Practical) Ethics in the actual case of
using CAM; medical ethos, question: ‘‘How
should we act when using/oﬀering/promoting
CAM? What is morally obligated, permitted or
forbidden?’’ (perspective of patient-physician rela-
tionship while consenting to a treatment, ethical
responsibility of a health care provider and
research ethics inclusive)
Level 2: Ethics about questions of oﬀer and pro-
motion of CAM as a health care provider in
treatment decision and information; question:
‘‘Should I actually use/oﬀer/promote CAM? Is it
morally obligated, permitted, forbidden to sug-
gest or to oﬀer CAM?’’ (perspective of patient-
physician relationship, ethical responsibility of a
health care provider)
Level 3: Ethics about questions of use, oﬀer and
promotion of CAM in a society in general; ques-
tion: ‘‘Should we use/oﬀer/promote CAM? Is
CAM itself morally obligated, permitted, forbid-
den?’’ (societal and ‘fundamental’ perspective)
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Level 1 is not the subject matter of the following
analysis. While level 1 is quite important in a
practical context and should not be disregarded, it
nonetheless lacks a more fundamental reﬂection
insofar as the justiﬁed general use of CAM is
already (implicitly) accepted or is just presupposed.
Hence, analytically speaking, level 1 must truly be
granted, and it must be clear how it may be granted
(through considerations of level 2 and 3) before
beginning to answer the questions of level 1.
Whilst there is some academic work primarily
for level 1, and to a certain degree also level 2 (see
for example Wardell Engebretson, 2001; Adams
et al., 2002; Kaler and Revella, 2002; Ernst and
Stone, 2004), level 2 and especially level 3 are less
represented and seldom directly addressed.
General abbreviations used in argument analysis
On the left side of the tables (logical structure): ‘Px’
stands for ‘Premise Nr. x’; ‘P0’ is commonly used
for a central presumption. ‘ICx’ means ‘Interme-
diate Conclusion Nr. x’. ‘A’ stands for ‘Axiom’. ‘C’
stands for ‘Conclusion’.
On the right side of the tables (sentence types),
only where relevant: ‘D’ stands for ‘descriptive’, ‘E’
for ‘evaluative’, ‘P’ for ‘prescriptive’ and ‘N’ for
‘normative’. ‘u’ means ‘universal’ and ‘s’ means
‘singularly’ related to the extension of application
(especially principles) or to the use of universal/
existential quantiﬁer.
Standard ethical principles of bioethics (Level 2)
On level 2, we can use established concepts and
principles of bioethics, as referred to in Beau-
champ and Childress (2001) and Hiller (1986), as
‘theories of the middle range’. While these princi-
ples are used for determining and reﬂecting the
outcome of practical decisions in a concrete
medical context on level 1, they provide a framing
of the more fundamental question on level 2:
should a certain treatment option be oﬀered,
promoted, or used?
Level 1 ‘as a whole’ could be used for justifying
issues if the premise is stated that a practice which
generates high ‘moral distress’, because of lacking
ethical standards, is overall ethically problematic.
If CAM would imply severe ethical problems if
applied, then CAM would be ethically problem-
atic.
Wardell and Engebretson, (2001, p. 332) stress
the point that many practitioners in CAM practice
are ‘‘complementary to or integrated within
biomedicine’’ and have a diﬀerent legal status
and ethical responsibility. ‘‘Typically’’, so Wardell
et al., ‘‘they [practitioners] provide care to a
self-selected clientele with homogenous beliefs
and expectations’’; CAM is ‘‘private medicine’’
(Ernst and Stone, 2004). Some CAM therapies do
relate directly to the belief system of a patient. This
can go as far as other treatments (‘alternative’ and
traditional ones) are not chosen instead of the
CAM therapy corresponding to the patient’s belief
system (Ruhl, 2002; Adams et al., 2002).
Respect for patient autonomy
Principle: A patient has the right to choose the
treatment she/he prefers, including to choose
between biomedicine and CAM. The concept of
patient autonomy entails that the person also has
the authority to determine what makes a good life
for her/him (eudaimonistic dimension). This even
counts in situations where others might consider a
diﬀerent decision to be better.
Values: Liberty, agency, and happiness.
Justiﬁcation:
Limits and problems: Patient autonomy (IC) as an
established concept of bioethics and located on an
individual ethics level can justify CAM or at least
many aspects of it. As long as the choice of
treatment is at liberty of the patient (at least not
coerced) (P3) there is no ethical reason against the
use of CAM as practice (CAM as belief system is
not justiﬁable with this principle, as it is related
to decision making, not to holding a belief).
The principle has its limits, though. Firstly, it
depends solely on the individual level without
taking institutional and social levels into account.
Secondly, not all preferences are legally and/or
P0 A person has the ceteris paribus right to
freely make decisions on her/his own.
(autonomy)
D/N u
IC [P0]: A patient x is allowed to choose the
treatment option she/he prefers.
N u
P1 The decision of patient x has to be
respected.
P u
P2 CAM practice y is a possible treatment
option for the given illness.
D s
P3 Patient x freely chooses the treatment
option CAM y.
D s
C CAM practice y is allowed (used/
oﬀered) and the choice has to be
respected.
P s
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morally acceptable. It should be clear that there
have to be constraints in general on what one can
freely choose. Thirdly, not all that we prefer and
choose is necessarily ‘wise’. This refers to the
epistemic dimension as well. Since some CAM-
positions have very strong spiritual beliefs, a
patient might choose a CAM therapy even if there
is plenty of evidence that the therapy is not
beneﬁcial (Adams et al., 2002). This occurs
because a patient chooses the therapy according
to her/his (spiritual) belief system (‘‘Do persons
have a right to what seems to be an utterly
ineﬀective therapy simply because it conforms to
their personal belief system?’’; Fuller, 1995, p.
133). Such situations pose questions on how far
the patient’s autonomy might reach, in particular
when the ethical responsibility of the health care
provider is considered.
Interestingly, autonomy seems also to be
granted at the ‘spiritual level’ in CAM. A
practitioner ‘‘could obtain spiritual permission
at the unconscious level, which was considered as
important as or more important than conscious
permission’’ (Wardell and Engebretson, 2001, p.
327). In regard of contemporary issues of auton-
omy in bioethical context and for informed
consent (see Informed Consent), this goes beyond
any intersubjective state of aﬀairs that can be
shown to express and document the autonomy of
a patient. Misuses and misinterpretations that
seem to be likely with such an approach to
autonomy harbour ethical problems on their
own. However, they can also be used as a
general ethical (and epistemological) objection
to CAM practices relating to such ‘‘spiritual
permission at the unconscious level’’.
Paternalism as justiﬁcation for CAM
Paternalism is a concept which values the episte-
mic authority of health care providers, regarding
medical-concerned issues, higher than the right
of the patient to participate in the decision-
making process. The paternalistic perspective
was reduced, but not fully given up, for more
autonomy-based perspectives in the last half of
the century (Troehler and Reiter-Theil, 1998).
Wardell and Engebretson (2001) assume that
CAM is more orientated towards paternalism
than biomedicine; this especially concerns those
positions located at the very right side of the
suggested CAM-continuum. It might be that the
patient (or ‘client’) respects the practitioner as a
‘wise person’ with the capability of ‘‘[brokering]
with the god(s) and spirits to accomplish healing’’
(Wardell and Engebretson, 2001, p. 321). The
importance of the virtue (of the practitioner) is
thoroughly stressed by complementary healing
and nursing (Wardell and Engebretson, 2001).
Wardell and Engebreton assume that this empha-
sis on the character of the practitioner is related
to the central part that spirituality plays in
healing.
The following argument could be a paternalistic
justiﬁcation for CAM:
What gives strength to a paternalistic justiﬁca-
tion of CAM is not just the higher competence in
knowing how to possibly heal someone (P2) (which
could also be said of biomedicine), but a higher
spiritual competence which entails more than just
adequate ways of healing (such as eudaimonistic
perspectives). Some CAM-practitioners might as-
sert that biomedicine lacks the competence of
healing (or ‘really’ healing). They may argue that
their approaches understand human well-being
better and are ‘‘cognizant of mental, moral, and
spiritual factors that go well beyond the physio-
logical considerations on which scientiﬁc medicine
relies.’’ (Fuller, 1995, p. 133). Since the practitio-
ners are the only group capable of (‘really’) healing
it is justiﬁed not to only use and oﬀer CAM but
also to promote it.
Beneﬁcence
Principle: The principle is mainly orientated to-
wards an individual ethics level, but can also be
used for extended ethical considerations, for
groups and institutions. It depends on how far
one looks at beneﬁcial eﬀects. For the sake of
simplicity, the extension of the principle will be
kept open in the following.
Values: Values of health and the value of relief.
P1 The person with the highest competence
(knowledge, skill, virtue) must decide.
P u
P2 A practitioner x knows how to heal and deal
with the illness y through ‘spiritual insight’ z
(or a similar skill).
D s
P3 A patient s (or a physician t) does not have this
knowledge or skill z.
D s
C Practitioner x (and not physician t) must de-
cide on behalf of patient s.
P s
COMPLEMENTARY AND ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE 333
Justiﬁcation:
Limits and problems: The principle of beneﬁcence
can be used for CAM-justiﬁcation. If it is ethically
obligated to do everything to increase the patient’s
health and CAM is such a way (or even a ‘better’
way), CAM as practice is justiﬁed.
However, the principle can solely be used as
justiﬁcation if a CAM-therapy does actually pro-
vide beneﬁt in health care (P2), and/or this can be
predicted with sufﬁcient certainty to prevent ‘‘cases
of excessive claims, exaggerated promises, and
deception and fraud’’ (Ernst and Stone, 2004,
p. 158). Otherwise it would violate both the
beneﬁcence and non-maleﬁcence principles as
reports on adverse eﬀects and similar negative
consequences have increased (Rhee, Garg, and
Hershey, 2004; Carroll, 2006; Quackwatch, 2006).
The ‘‘depth of commitment to an alternative belief
system’’ and ‘‘anecdotal evidence of therapy eﬀec-
tiveness’’ cannot be considered suﬃcient for satis-
fying ethical obligations (Drane, 1995, p. 141).
This refers to a common topic in CAM-related
discussions, especially on behalf of CAM-critics: Is
a ‘‘it works’’ (as it is put by some critics) suﬃcient
to declare a CAM therapy as a meaningful health
beneﬁt? And is this beneﬁt really in relation to the
illness (P3)? What if this ‘working’ is a consequence
of a logical or cognitive fallacy6 or of biases
(Beyerstein, 1999) or relies solely on psychological
eﬀects (placebo-eﬀect)? As one will remark, the
question of beneﬁcence depends also on descriptive
states of aﬀairs and on conceptual issues.
This is rather important in respect of different
concepts of ‘healing’ which are questionably used
in biomedicine and CAM, as such concepts are
also constituted by historical and cultural factors
(Drane, 1995). Some studies and comments (War-
dell and Engebretson, 2001; Ruhl, 2002; Ernst and
Stone, 2004; Thorne et al., 2002; Fuller, 1995)
indicate that practitioners in CAM have a broader
use of the concept of healing, of incorporating
aspects of love and relationships, as well as of the
patient’s spiritual existence that goes beyond a
more traditional disease/cure focus (Wardell and
Engebretson, 2001, p. 331). As Thorne et al.
(2002) note, health care consumers are regularly
more orientated to their ‘‘illness experience’’ than
to the ‘‘disease care’’ to which traditional medicine
is entitled. Also, unlike biomedical research,
placebo-eﬀects might not be seen as a negative
result concerning therapy evaluation (although the
therapy itself does not heal). However, it might be
viewed as part of a ‘holistic’ approach that
encompasses comfort measures in its healing
concept (Thorne et al., 2002). Thus the use of
placebo would not be seen as a medical fraud. The
problem of fraud in medical treatment is often
perceived as a focal point of the ethical contro-
versy in CAM-debates (Fuller, 1995). Therefore, it
poses the important question that if the patients
are eventually ‘better oﬀ’, (deliberate) fraud,
placebo-eﬀects or lying to the patients and the
oﬀer of such treatments in a society are ethically
justiﬁable.
Non-maleﬁcence
Principle: The principle exempliﬁes an essential
part of the physician’s ethos: ﬁrst, do not harm!
Values: Health and relief.
Justiﬁcation:
Limits and problems: The principle of non-malef-
icence might be a problem for the ethical justiﬁca-
tion of CAM as practice because when a CAM-
treatment does harm, it obviously collides with the
principle. While this sounds trivial it is a major
critical issue. This is especially important if not
only CAM-therapies that in themselves might be
hazardous are considered, but also harm indirectly
due to not engaging in eﬀective treatment when the
CAM-treatment is more or less useless in terms of
healing a disease (Adams et al., 2002; Carroll,
2003; Drane, 1995), for example leukaemia. To
P0 What promotes health and gives beneﬁt is to be
done. (beneﬁcence)
P u
P1 A treatment x that has beneﬁcial eﬀects on
health is an obligation.
P u
P2 CAM practice y does have beneﬁcial eﬀects. D/E s
P3 CAM practice y is at least a possible treatment
option for the given illness.
D s
P4 Where there are several possible treatment
options none is per se obligated, but all are
permitted.
N u
C CAM practice y as a possible treatment option
is permitted or in strong cases obligated (use/
oﬀer/promotion).
N/P s
P0 That which decreases health and does harm
should not be done. (non-maleﬁcence)
P u
P1 A treatment x that does have harming eﬀects
on health is forbidden.
P u
P2 CAM practice y does not have harming eﬀects. D/E s
C CAM practice y is not forbidden (use/oﬀer/
promotion).
N s
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advocate CAM in such situations, e.g. because of
patient autonomy, can collide with the physician’s
ethos.
As with the principle of beneﬁcence, at this
point empirical, descriptive and conceptual con-
siderations become not only fruitful, but also
necessary for the normative questions.
Informed consent
Principle: An informed consent should make a
patient capable of deciding correctly about her/his
treatment. An informed consent is dependent on the
patient’s competence to understand treatments and
their consequences and to make reasonable deci-
sions. It is also dependent on the ability of the health
care provider to inform the patent accordingly.
Values: The concept of informed consent is now-
adays a standard legal and ethical procedure to
maintain and promote a patient’s autonomy.
Justiﬁcation:
Limits and problems: Only ‘CAM as practice’ is
concerned. In the context of CAM, Ernst (2001)
highlights three points that constitute ‘‘necessary
information’’: (a) the probability of beneﬁting from
the procedure; (b) the probability of risks associ-
ated with the procedure; and (c) the alternative
options feasible and available as well as their risks
and beneﬁts.
While this is standard information for biomed-
icine, there might be problems in CAM, e.g. also
give alternative options for CAM (biomedicine)
and their risks and beneﬁts (P1). Ruhl, (2002)
draws attention to a specialty of informed consent
in CAM: the so – called ‘‘spiritual informed
consent’’. As most CAM have rich spiritual roots,
a patient should also be informed by the health
care provider about potential conﬂicts with the
spiritual/religious beliefs of the patient when pro-
posing a certain CAM treatment. Many people
would object to accepting a treatment that entails
beliefs that would conﬂict with their own spiritual/
religious belief system (Ruhl 2002).
As Ernst (2004) commented, the problems of
informed consent for CAM are: (a) what informa-
tion should be considered as ‘‘necessary and
relevant’’ for the informed consent and can this
‘‘suﬃcient information’’ be provided by the prac-
titioner; (b) a rigorously applied informed consent
might lead to serious conﬂicts of interest in CAM:
the practitioner might be obligated to state that the
beneﬁt of the treatment is not certain, that possible
side eﬀects are not negligible, and that other
treatment choices do not have the possibility of
harm; this can deter patients from choosing the
CAM treatment. This could have ﬁnancial conse-
quences for the CAM practitioner who is often
privately paid by his patients.
Finally, the question arises again of how
placebo-effects and lying are to be dealt with.
Some CAM-practices might be ethically problem-
atic since deliberately not saying the truth about
known or presumed ‘working mechanisms’ of a
practice collides with the concept of informed
consent.
Level 3-considerations
Regarding level 3, not only accepted or established
bioethical principles and the compliance to these
principles are at stake, also epistemological, meta-
physical, ontological, semantic and meta-ethical
assumptions must to be taken into account. This
applies especially conceding that recent biomedical
ethics is founded on the same assumptions as
Western biomedicine itself (Thorne et al., 2002).
The reﬂection of these assumptions is philosoph-
ically paramount for gaining an adequate account
on the issue.
It seems obvious that a position with other
philosophical presumptions would make more
assumptions than just utter other empirical claims
like biomedicine. Even the empirical state of affairs
would be interpreted in a distinct way – accord-
ingly to the philosophical assumptions made by the
position about what counts as ‘knowledge’ or
about what ‘healing’ or even ‘truth’ means (as
P0 A decision of a person in health care has to be
informed and consent has to be given accord-
ingly for a treatment action. (informed consent)
P u
IC [P0]: A patient x has to give informed consent
for a treatment y.
P u
P1 For an informed consent, all relevant infor-
mation about the treatment and treatment
options have to be given by the health care
provider z.
P u
P2 It is possible to give all relevant information
about CAM treatment s.
D s
P3 All relevant information about CAM treat-
ments is given by the health care provider z,
providing veracity.
D s
P4 Patient x chooses the CAM treatments and
gives informed consent to health care provider
z.
D s
C CAM treatment s is allowed (used/oﬀered/
promoted).
N s
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Thorne et al., 2002 also note). Thus, it could be
that a quite diﬀerent concept of truth is used in a
CAM position with a high ‘metaphysical commit-
ment’. Furthermore, right and wrong could meta-
ethically be determined teleological and thus
objectively through the order of nature or (a)
god(s) (or something similar).
Philosophically it is not sufﬁcient to just rely on
scientiﬁc experience to refute such a position; in
this respect the position does not accept central
assumptions of contemporary philosophy of sci-
ence and scientiﬁc methods. Therefore, those
assumptions made on behalf of epistemological
and metaphysical reasons have to be considered.
Metaphysically justiﬁed values (metaphysical
knowledge)
Concept: A certain CAM-belief system and the
associated CAM-practice is justiﬁed because of a
metaphysically ‘grasped’ value or knowledge (due
to a speciﬁc epistemic potential that is not available
to all persons, at least not without special training
and accepting the metaphysical position at hand).
These values or knowledge-tokens often claim
certainty and are thus ‘absolutely true’ and ethi-
cally good/right, since it can be assumed that most
CAM-related metaphysical positions do not accept
the crucial distinction between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ as
most modern philosophy does.
Values: Speciﬁc values related to the metaphysical
belief system; spiritual values; perhaps epistemic
values (‘absolute truth’).
Justiﬁcation:
Limits and problems: This type of justiﬁcation can
be confronted especially with a problem concern-
ing P0 and P1: ‘critic-immunization’ and the
‘congruency-principle’. The normative power of
P3 might be criticized. Surely, also P4 can be
disputed. But I would like to focus on P0/P1 and
P3, as they are the most important prerequisites in
this justiﬁcation strategy.
However, it has to be differentiated between
two diverse levels where such problems can be
identiﬁed: the belief system as such (‘theory’ of a
CAM therapy), and the effects, ‘the outcome’
(‘functionality’ of a CAM therapy; see also Out-
come of a treatment). Therefore it can occur that
the ‘theory’ of a CAM therapy is ‘critic-immu-
nized’, but the eﬀects are testable (by scientiﬁc
standards). The following sections are more con-
cerned with the belief system as such.
The problem of ‘critic-immunization’
The concept of critic- or error-immunization might
prove useful in evaluating CAM-related metaphys-
ical positions (strong ‘metaphysical commitment’).
‘Critic-immunization’ should not be seen as the
strict concept developed by Hans Albert and Karl
Popper, but rather as a general (epistemological)
attitude or property of a theory which renders it
impossible to critically discuss intersubjective state-
ments (‘dogmatism’). It can also be seen as a
minimal requirement of rational enquiry that no
claim stands per se outside of critical examination
and criticism.
In metaphysical context and regarding CAM
this refers to asserting absolute values lying
beyond the reach of persons or groups who
disagree with the position (P0) and to maintaining
that no counter-evidence will ever be able to
prove the position wrong.7 The problem with such
a dedication to a metaphysically ‘gained’ knowl-
edge or value is that it neither lies in reach for
evaluation by persons who are not part of the
position, nor in reach for general rational exam-
ination.8
Supposing that there is not only a methodolog-
ical but also an ethical obligation to justify one’s
belief that leads to an action (in particular if the
health of someone is concerned or crucial rights
would be in danger e.g. a danger to the value of
human dignity), a CAM position asserting meta-
physical certainty9 for its own sake might ﬁnd itself
in an ethically problematic state. In such a situa-
tion ‘critic-immunization’ might not only be meth-
odologically unsound, but also ethically
questionable.
A CAM practice relies on CAM belief system. D s
P0 There exists an epistemic capacity, which is
reliable for gaining knowledge with certainty
about x, and proponents of CAM z have this
epistemic capacity.
D s
P1 x is true and x is good. (metaphysical state of
aﬀair)
D/E u
IC1 [P0, P1]: CAM belief system z, which relies on
beliefs about x, is ‘absolutely true’.
D s
P2 What is good must be promoted. P u
P3 An action that promotes x should be done
(metaphysically obligated?).
N s
P4 An action that promotes what is good should
be based on knowledge (truth).
N u
IC2 [A, P2, P3, P4, IC1]: Action y of CAM practice
z that promotes x is based on knowledge
(about x).
D s
C Practice of CAM z should be done (is allowed
or obligated).
N/P s
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The ‘congruency-principle’
CAM-related positions that are setting up values
and normative principles on metaphysical grounds
(P1, P3) can be criticized by arguing against the
existence of entities or (metaphysical, ontological
...) principles made by the position – this is the
topic of the ‘congruency-principle’ (Albert, 1985).
If there is critical evidence which shows that there
is no reason to postulate those entities or to believe
in them, then all normative sentences that depend
on the truth of the statements concerning those
entities are open to criticism and eventual
refutation.
Are the assertions about metaphysical entities
true? Assume that there is enough rational evidence
to refute them or at least enough to lay strong doubt
about the truth of them. Obviously the same is true
for the normative conclusion if the statements are
considered false or epistemic highly problematic/
disputed. As Quine put it, sooner or later you have
to pay your ‘ontological debts’: ontologically
postulating entities can backﬁre epistemologically.
Simply asserting them cannot be enough.
At least, the principle shows that there can be
ethical objections to normative-ethical sentences
formulated by CAM positions itself; It can be
ethically problematic to follow a principle that is
derided from questionable premises that are con-
cerned with factual statements. On behalf of a
position with high ‘metaphysical commitment’
though, it must be conceded that if their state-
ments would be in fact true, they would also be
justiﬁed.
Outcome of a treatment
Concept: A therapy, treatment or remedy does
have an ‘outcome’: how eﬀective was the treat-
ment, was the disease healed or does the patient at
least feel better? How burdening was the treatment
itself?
Values: Health and relief.
Justiﬁcation: There exists an argument of CAM-
proponents sometimes used to highlight the advan-
tage of CAM contrary to biomedicine that would
also entail an ethical superiority:
Limits and problems: There are two problems with
this argument (though it is valid). Firstly, it uses a
hardly stated premise:
This descriptive premise is not undisputed as
everyone who participates in the ongoing debate
about CAM knows. Primary, the question arises
again what could be meant with statements that a
remedy or a treatment ‘works’ and what we mean
with ‘heal’ (see also Beneﬁcence). Since there is no
proof available by modern methodologies, the
epistemological dysfunction of anecdotal evidence
which is used for ‘proving’ the eﬀectiveness of
CAM-related therapies and remedies is often at
stake (Thorne et al., 2002; Carroll, 2003; Glazer,
2005). In relation to the problems of ‘critic-
immuzation’ mentioned earlier, the question arises
if the outcome of a therapy is testable (with
scientiﬁc methods) and can be judged accordingly
or if even the outcome is somewhat ‘critic-immu-
nized’ (which poses similar problems as discussed
in The problem of ‘critic-immunization’).
The second problem refers to another presuppo-
sition in premise 2, namely the assumption that
CAM treatments can never or at least seldom be
harmful. Here, one has to consider the uselessness of
a treatment whichmight harm indirectly (by deﬂect-
ing from a useful treatment being applied).
Justice
Concept: On level 3, justice for ensuring equal
rights to citizens in a society and for providing the
social ‘framework’ within an autonomous subject
may be used for ethical justiﬁcation of CAM. In
fact, justice as a virtue of social institutions (Rawls,
1971, p. 3) can be seen as being a prerequisite for
(patient) autonomy on the individual ethics level.
Values: Justice can itself be seen as a value.
Justice is intertwined with values of personal and
social goods, for example with human dignity and
ethically functioning social systems.
Justiﬁcation: If there is a right to freely choose a
treatment (on level 1 and level 2 as part of ‘respect
of autonomy’), this right must be secured by
justice. Patients preferring biomedical treatments
must have the right to do so, but of course the
same must be the case for patients preferring CAM
treatments. Besides, given the obligation by justice
P1 CAM ‘works’. D s
P2 CAM does not include surgery, invasive diagnosis
or dangerous side-eﬀects as biomedicine does.
D s
P3 Treatment without such side-eﬀects is healthier,
‘better’. (Thus ethically preferable)
E u
C CAM often is the better choice than biomedicine. D s
P0 The beneﬁcial eﬀects of CAM on health are at
least comparable (perhaps sometimes even better)
than biomedicine.
D s
COMPLEMENTARY AND ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE 337
of a government in a social democracy (e.g.
Switzerland) to provide health care in the same
‘amount’ and quality to all citizens, CAM might be
justiﬁed by means of justice if CAM is a sound
alternative to biomedicine (see Ethos of science).
Therefore, it could be unfair not to offer CAM,
given the justice of considering and offering all
relevant treatment options:
Limits and problems: This justiﬁcation presupposes
that CAM is a relevant treatment option (P1).
Additionally, the justiﬁcation can only be used for
‘CAM as practice’ and when oﬀering CAM.
A concern related to distributive justice could,
on the other hand, be used against ethical justiﬁ-
cation of CAM, even only by societies with
obligatory health care insurances subsidized by
governmental tax (as in Switzerland): it could be
considered unfair if a large part of the society has
to pay for treatment types (CAM) which they may
not approve of and which are directed only
towards a small part of the society. Only treat-
ments which have shown to be eﬀective and
beneﬁcial and are congruent with the interests of
the population should be part of obligatory health
care insurances that are subsidized by governmen-
tal tax (Thorne et al., 2002). While the qualiﬁcation
strengthens the argument, it shifts the burden of
proof once again to the question of ‘rational’
beneﬁcence and eﬀectiveness of CAM.
Freedom of speech, freedom of thought and freedom
of religion
A possibility to maintain ethical justiﬁcation of
CAM on the level of social ethics is directed to
three intertwined, although separately addressable
rights in a democratic society: freedom of speech,
thought and religion. A prerequisite of all three
rights, in particular for free speech and free
thoughts, is a common liberal attitude towards
democracy.
Freedom of speech
Concept: Grants that a citizen may speak (express)
freely without censorship. While justiﬁcations for
freedom of speech (also called ‘freedom of expres-
sion’) can be disputed like all justiﬁcations (for
example from CAM positions with high ‘meta-
physical commitment’ which are nearly ‘closed
societies’ that do not necessarily accept democracy
as the best governmental system), it expresses a
minimal factual agreement which is also guaran-
teed under some laws.
Values: Autonomy, equality, tolerance.
Justiﬁcation:
Limits and problems: Free speech can be used for
justifying CAM belief systems (not CAM prac-
tice) or at least the discussion of CAM in a
political context. Similar to the freedom of
thought (see below), the right to say (express)
something does not include the truth of what is
said (expressed).
Freedom of thought
Concept: Freedom of thought (or ‘freedom of
belief’) is a concept more directed to the right of
holding a viewpoint or a belief system irrespective
of what the view of others might be; it is the right
to ‘believe whatever one wants to believe’, justiﬁed
mainly by reasons of autonomy.
Values: Autonomy, equality, tolerance.
Justiﬁcation:
Limits and problems: It is important to realize that
freedom of thought means that one has the right to
believe irrespective of what others think, but this
does not mean that what one believes is necessarily
right (true). This ‘category mistake’ can be rele-
vant in regard of the ethical justiﬁcation of CAM.
As mentioned before, the right to believe some-
thing is not the same as ‘having right’ in believing
something. If I take belief p, p could also be false,
P1 All relevant treatment options have to be oﬀered. P u
P2 CAM practice x is a relevant treatment option. D s
IC [P1, P2]: It would be unfair not to oﬀer CAM
practice x.
E s
C [P1, IC]: CAM practice x has to be oﬀered. P s
P1 One has the right to speak (express oneself)
freely.
D/N u
P2 CAM belief x is an object that can be
expressed. (can be applied to P1)
D s
C CAM belief x is allowed to be expressed freely
(in free speech)
N s
P1 One has the right to believe what one wants to
believe.
D/N u
P2 CAM belief x is an object that can be believed.
(can be applied to P1)
D u
C CAM belief x is allowed to be believed. N s
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even if I have the right to hold that belief in a
democratic society.
When truth, plausibility, the validity or justiﬁ-
cation of a belief or a set of beliefs becomes
paramount, then this difference also becomes
paramount. It is getting philosophically ludicrous
to maintain that the right to believe what a CAM
position entails in such situations is tantamount to
the truth of those propositions. In a democratic
society it would be a dangerous conception, as
dangers to individuals, groups and society as a
whole could not be assessed and controlled any-
more. Therefore, ethically speaking, CAM as
practice can only be justiﬁed by means of freedom
of belief if there is evidence that it does not harm.
Considerations and examination of the truth of the
statements made by CAM positions would again
be important as soon as health and possible risks
are concerned. Moreover, it cannot be evaded by
relying on free thought.
Freedom of religion
Concept: Freedom of religion is closely related to
the freedom of thought, but often more articulated
in terms of tolerance than in terms of autonomy.
The concept incorporates free belief and practice of
a religion and also the freedom not to believe in
any religion at all (atheism).
Values: Tolerance, autonomy.
Justiﬁcation:
Limits and problems: Freedom of religion includes
practices of a religion, but constraints exist regard-
ing how religion is practiced. Thus it is problematic
to justify a CAM practice that might prove
harmful or dangerous or that violates rights
granted to third parties. Furthermore, relying on
freedom of religion is only an option for CAM
positions with strong ‘metaphysical commitment’:
CAM positions that are quasi-religious or actually
religions. Positions of CAM that do not expel high
‘metaphysical commitment’ and are nearer to
scientiﬁc positions cannot use freedom of religion
as a possible justiﬁcation.
Ethos of science
Concept: If we accept (stated in a simpliﬁed
manner) that science is a subsystem of society with
special epistemic authority (like sociologically
assumed in the term ‘knowledge-society’, e.g. Van
Duelmen and Rauschenbach, 2004) then the ethos
of science also has to be considered, especially if
this epistemic authority is extended to or speciﬁed
for health care issues. A CAM-related therapy or
general approach to health care has to withstand
objections concerned with keeping the ethos of
science as a guarantee for epistemic quality. This
objection is of course meaningless if an epistemol-
ogy is accepted which favours other forms of
knowledge as epistemic authority (like perhaps
some CAM positions with strong ‘metaphysical
commitment’). Obviously, the epistemologies held
by these positions have to be examined and
debated in that case. If a CAM-related position
claims to be science or to be justiﬁed by scientiﬁc
means the objection is signiﬁcant.
The concept of the ethos of science which
Merton (1942) gave will be used, for reasons of
simplicity, even if there was considerable disagree-
ment with the concept throughout the years.10
Values: Truth and knowledge.
Justiﬁcation:
Limits and problems: A treatment where the truth
(concerning eﬃciency or theory) is questionable
might reasonably be objected to if a health care
practitioner is committed to the ethos of science
(as it is reasonable to assume that doctors in
biomedicine should be). This would ethically lead
to risk/beneﬁt-considerations (Adams et al., 2002)
as well as critique on theoretical assumptions
which the treatment is based on. Doubts about
P1 One has the right to have a religion and to
practice it.
D/N u
P2 CAM belief x is religious-like or a religion.
(can be applied to P1)
D u
C CAM belief x is allowed to be held as a religion
and to be practised.
N s
P0 A knowledge system that proposes to be an
epistemic authority has to be structured insti-
tutionally accordingly to the ethos of science.
N u
P1 Only a knowledge system functioning with the
ethos of science is a legitimate and reliable (!)
source of knowledge ( = ‘certiﬁed knowl-
edge’).
E u
P2 Only reliable and critically produced knowl-
edge about health care is ethically justiﬁable,
due to risk/beneﬁt and possible harm consid-
erations.
N u
P3 CAM position x is a knowledge system func-
tioning with the ethos of science.
D s
C CAM position x is allowed. N s
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the eﬀectiveness and beneﬁcial eﬀects will lead to
considerations if the treatment is soundly justiﬁed
by reliable knowledge about the world.
The norm of organised scepticism (critically
examining new and old knowledge claims and
trying to provide and support institutionally,
displaying a ‘professional sceptical attitude’ to
beliefs and assertions) might be one of the most
objectionable aspects of CAM. Most CAM posi-
tions do not regard knowledge as fallible and
provisional as science does (Kaptchuk and Miller,
2005). They sometimes ignore research ﬁndings
and often have unrigorous standards for subjecting
therapeutical claims to critical review (Drane,
1995). But as champions of science often point
out, it is exactly this kind of attitude and method
that ‘‘makes science to science’’ (e.g. Albert, 1985;
Carroll, 2003).
A CAM position where such ideals are not
realized or are insufﬁciently followed or where
social/institutional structures for realizing such
norms are non-existing can be a target of ethical
rejection (based on arguments that the knowledge
is not reliable, might be harmful or not open to
critical examination).
The argument gathers strength regarding CAM
positions which assume that their assertions and
beliefs are proven to be true by scientiﬁc enterprise
(even if ‘special methodologies’ ﬁrstly have to be
used or invented, for example to cope with the
‘holistic nature’ of most CAM; Ernst and Stone,
2004; Adams et al., 2002; Thorne et al. 2002).
In other words, positions in CAM with minimal
‘metaphysical commitment’ which accept or actu-
ally propose science and scientiﬁc examination in
health care issues are thoroughly obligated to the
ethos of science and its norms might be criticized if
they do not feel obliged to maintain the ethos.
Legitimation and justiﬁcation confusions
Conceptual confusion is possible in debates about
the legitimation and justiﬁcation of CAM.
The term ‘Legitimation’ relates to a social
process or function based on factual agreement
(facticity) of values and norms. Legitimation can
be reached by political legitimation (e.g. due to a
decision made according to democratic processes)
or by legal legitimation (correspondence with
factual law). While this addresses legitimation on
a social level there are also ‘lesser order’ legitima-
tions in sub-systems or groups.
‘Justiﬁcation’ is the classic term for a rational
function in the ‘realm of reasons’, the ‘context of
justiﬁcation’. Only validity issues are relevant and
not factual agreements or facticity. Justiﬁcation
can be related to cognitive justiﬁcation (Why is
x true?), epistemic justiﬁcation (Why is it reason-
able for us to accept proposition x as truth?) and
quite obviously also to normative justiﬁcation
(Why is y right? Why is z good?) (Schnaedelbach,
2000). Justiﬁcations are open to rational dis-
course, which is an exchange of reasons and
counter-reasons. Additionally, there can be pru-
dential justiﬁcations for actions (Why did you do
this? – Because of x), but they lack the categor-
ical, non-personal element which is akin to
justiﬁcations as they are used in rational enter-
prises, especially in philosophy.
The confusions that can complicate debates
about legitimation/justiﬁcation of CAM are the
following ones: ﬁrstly, the difference between
legitimation and justiﬁcation might not be re-
garded, as it for example takes place when freedom
of thought (which is politically legitimized) is taken
as a justiﬁcation for a given set of belief. Secondly,
some proponents and also opponents may mistake
political or legal legitimation with ethical or even
epistemic justiﬁcation. This confusion is rather
problematic, because a sole (!) reliance to a
legitimation does not justify anything ethically
and especially not anything epistemically. The leap
from the premise ‘‘x is politically/legally legiti-
mized’’ to the conclusion ‘‘therefore, x is true/right/
good’’ would be as obscure as it can get. This takes
place because the ‘argument’ is prone to a sort of
democratic fallacy. An outcome of a sound dem-
ocratic process is of course legitimated, but not
necessarily true/right (proven true/right through a
process of justiﬁcation, where reasons for the
truth/rightness are given). Furthermore it is not
guaranteed that an according conclusion will be
supported if a majority thinks that CAM is true or
that CAM should be practiced.
Summary
CAM can be justiﬁed by means of level 2 consid-
erations, but often only with qualiﬁcation, or
only dependent on several descriptive states of
affairs. Best chances are offered by reliance on
patient autonomy and beneﬁcence (as supposed by
the hypotheses). On level 3, there are also possi-
bilities of justifying CAM ethically. The best
chances can be found in freedom of thought and
freedom of religion, while problems are arising
because of epistemological reasons in an ‘internal
view’ of CAM positions (as theory evaluation).
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Table 1 summarizes the possibilities and qual-
iﬁcations.
Conclusions and discussion
Central ethical principles in CAM are respect for
autonomy, principle of beneﬁcence and freedom of
speech, thought and religion. Collisions with the
non-maleﬁcence principle and informed consent
have been shown as likely, while justice might also
account positively for CAM. Shared and distinc-
tive values between biomedicine and CAM have
been identiﬁed. Epistemological reﬂections are
signiﬁcant for determining effectiveness and
truth/plausibility of CAM-related therapies and
positions. Collisions with the ethos of science are
likely, in particular by CAM with strong ‘meta-
physical commitment’.
Principles and universal normative sentences
Argumentation, analysis and evaluation have
shown that common objections to a justiﬁcation
strategy are rarely oriented towards ethical princi-
ples (such as beneﬁcence or non-maleﬁcence) or
universal normative sentences, but rather towards
singular sentences, especially descriptive ones.
Exceptions might be speciﬁc normative sentences
due to ‘metaphysical commitment’ (e.g. spiritual
beliefs).
Beneﬁcence and non-maleﬁcence
As the summary shows, most strategies of justify-
ing (or de-justifying) CAM ﬁnally refer (as descrip-
tive circumstances or as constraints) to issues of
beneﬁcence and non-maleﬁcence. It is plausible to
assume that these are the most important aspects
concerning ethical justiﬁcation of CAM. This is not
surprising for any health care area, although
problems arise because beneﬁcence and non-malef-
icence rely extensively on the concept of ‘healing’
and ‘health’. The question of how to ethically deal
with placebo-effects is open.
Relevance of non-ethical disciplines and aspects
Given the great importance of beneﬁcence and non-
maleﬁcence issues, certain non-ethical disciplines
become paramount in determining the range of the
ethical justiﬁcation of CAM. Epistemological ques-
tions are inevitable and as shown on level 3 even
semantical, metaphysical/ontological andmeta-eth-
ical aspects have to be considered. It is not sufﬁcient
to solely rely on empirical data for it is produced,
interpreted and evaluated according to established
and accepted philosophical underpinnings (e.g. a
‘disease/cure’-focus vs. an ‘illness experience’-fo-
cus). Such assumptions also have to be rigorously
questioned and examined for the purpose of deter-
mining the ethical justiﬁcation of CAM.
An ‘only ethics’-approach (such as some utili-
tarian approaches, but also applied ethics
approaches such as the standard principles of
bioethics) presuppose the epistemic justiﬁcation or
just ignore it. Generally utilitarianism, especially
preference utilitarianism, seems to do the best work
in justifying CAM since it can evade substantial
questions (e.g. the truth of a CAM position).
Decisionism would evade substantial issues such as
the whole discussion about epistemology and
methodology as well as the rightness of CAM is
reduced to what citizens chose in a democratic
system. However, the problem with both ap-
proaches is exactly this evasion since they do not
question if a CAM therapy at hand is epistemically
justiﬁed.
Values
Both biomedicine and CAM share a number of
ethical and ethics-related values relevant to healing
and caring: human dignity, autonomy, the value of
health and happiness/well-being on the individual
and social level. They might also share some non-
ethical values such as epistemic values (e.g. the
values of truth and knowledge), but may maintain
a different axiology. The goals, however, are very
similar, e.g. promoting health, relieving suffering
and avoiding harm (Kaptchuk and Miller, 2005;
Ernst and Stone, 2004).
However, there are some differences, especially
in CAM positions with ‘metaphysical commitment’
that have a strong spiritual underpinning. In these
positions, values that are not shared with biomed-
icine can be a problematic issue (such as the value
of nature as a healing power (Kaptchuk and
Miller, 2005) not being shared). Additionally, it
must be stressed that sharing a value is not
tantamount to promoting or realizing this value
in the same way; values can be promoted or realized
in multiple ways, and CAM positions might do this
in ways quite diﬀerent from biomedicine.
Further research
It has not been possible to carry out a detailed
analysis of speciﬁc CAM positions (such as
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ayurvedic medicine, chiropractic, acupuncture,
homeopathy etc.) in order to go beyond general
considerations. This seems to be an open ﬁeld for
research: to examine which intrinsic/extrinsic val-
ues and principles are at stake by speciﬁc CAM
positions, how strong their ‘metaphysical commit-
ment’ is and what their philosophical underpin-
nings are like. Qualitative research of social
sciences and hermeneutical ethics might be
fruitful and could be organized interdisciplinarily.
For gaining more insight in the legitimation dis-
course, studies of sociology of knowledge could be
valuable.
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Notes
1. This is a content-shortened version of the original pa-
per. A longer and more elaborated version can be ob-
tained from the author.
2. According to the German tradition, ‘science’ as a
general term (German: wissenschaft) refers to natural
sciences, social sciences and humanities.
3. The problem with the predicate ‘metaphysical’ lies in
at least two separate uses of the word. As a philoso-
pher, ‘metaphysics’ is regularly conceived of as a ra-
tional reﬂection on the formal conditions and
prerequisites about our conceptions of reality, nowa-
days often through analysis of language (Runggaldier
and Kanzian, 1998). For a non-philosopher (and
probably for some philosophers as well), ‘metaphysics’
is more akin to a quasi-religious belief system, like
‘New Age’ esoteric, or might be a general term for all
that is concerned neither with empirical nor semanti-
cal issues. The diﬀerence between a philosophical and
an ‘esoteric’ view of metaphysics lies between meta-
physics which is very detailed in regard of content and
a more formal approach on metaphysics for examin-
ing and grounding ontological formal-orientated
assumptions or presuppositions, as in contemporary
‘analytic’ philosophy. Compare, intuitively, an ap-
proach to metaphysics/ontology of a philosopher like
Willard van Orman Quine and its interest in ‘‘what
there basically (categorical) is’’ with a metaphysical
system of, say, Deepak Chopra to see the point I am
aiming at.
4. With ‘metaphysical commitment’ I mean a cognitive
(belief, assertion) and/or emotional characteristic that
a position entails for its proponents. These (spiritual)
beliefs mean something to the person; they are part
of the personal ‘weltanschauung’ – The importance of
metaphysical and other philosophical underpinnings
in CAM is obvious when considering the problem of
‘rationality’ or ‘irrationality’ of a practice since CAM
is often called ‘irrational’ by its critics. CAM-practi-
tioners may ‘‘(...) respond that every therapy is ra-
tional insofar as its methods of treatment are logically
entailed by its fundamental premises or its assump-
tions about the nature of disease.’’ (Fuller, 1995, p.
133; emphasis added).
5. Although it should be obvious, I would like to state
clearly that all considerations about ethical justiﬁca-
tion made in this paper must – in principle – also
manage to be addressed at biomedicine and all health
care related topics; if not, an unwarranted ‘double
standard’ would be the case. While there might be
some considerations which hardly can be addressed at
contemporary biomedicine, this is because it lacks the
descriptive properties relevant for such consider-
ations.
6. This has been labelled ‘pragmatic fallacy’: ‘‘The prag-
matic fallacy is committed when one argues that
something is true because it works. (...).’’ (Carroll,
2003).
7. See for example proponents of Ayurvedic Medicine,
criticized by Meera Nanda (2006): ‘‘(...) On the other
hand, we hear repeated claims from traditional
healers and modern gurus alike that no amount of
research can alter or refute the ‘Eternal and Absolute
Truths’ of Ayurveda which was supposedly revealed
to the Vedic seers at the very ‘beginning of time.’
Even AYUSH, the government agency responsible
for scientiﬁc research, describes Ayurveda as having
‘originated with the origin of the universe itself.’’’
8. One should not naı¨vely assume that positions with
strong ‘metaphysical commitment’ would accept the
dedication to ‘rational enquiry’ altogether. They
might claim ‘other’ forms of enquiry and sources of
knowledge that are privileged to rational accounts.
When metaphysical positions vary in this degree, it
seems to mark the end of all intersubjectivity.
9. The problem is not that we know that a given strong
metaphysical position is wrong. The problem is that
we can also not know that it is true and the possibility
to show the truth of the position without already
having to presuppose the whole truth of the position
might be levelled beyond any rational recognition.
10. Merton assumed that the ethos of science consists of
four distinct concepts that bind scientiﬁc working on
normative grounds: universalism, communalism, disin-
terestedness and organized scepticism. These norms
are legitimised through institutionalised values in the
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scientiﬁc system and derived from institutionalised
goals and methods of science: the extension of certi-
ﬁed knowledge.
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